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SUMMARY OF REPLY 
There are two issues in this appeal, and they are both narrow, straightforward, and 
purely legal - (1) whether the district court applied the correct legal standard for the 
private attorney general doctrine; and (2) whether the district court erred when it assumed 
it had no inherent equitable authority to award attorneys fees outside of some specific, 
enumerated doctrine. Because the district court erred in both respects, this Court should 
remand this case with instructions to decide Plaintiffs' request for attorneys fees under 
the correct legal standards. 
The County's brief never directly addresses these two issues. Instead, it advances 
a litany of tangential, erroneous, fact-based arguments that are not at issue here - from 
governmental immunity, to CLUDMA, to a dissertation on why other states have not 
adopted the private attorney general doctrine. Those are not the issues in this appeal, and 
they are, in any event, legally incorrect. The County has no immunity for its illegal, 
knowing and wilful refusal to enforce the law, and its position that equity cannot 
compensate a private citizen who has been forced to do what the County would not - at 
great personal expense - has no support in the law. The equitable power to award 
attorneys fees in exceptional cases exists for precisely such situations, and had the district 
court recognized that it had that authority, it would have granted Plaintiffs' motion. 
The County's illegal abdication of its duty has forced a crushing burden onto the 
plaintiffs in this case. For more than a decade, they have endured atrocious living 
conditions, surrounded on three sides by towering illegal commercial buildings that the 
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County approved over Plaintiffs" repeated protests. They have now spent in excess of 
$5009000 in attorneys fees simply to enforce the law - something the County, by any 
measure, should have done itself. Their perseverance in this case has resulted in a court 
order requiring public roads to be restored to safe conditions, benefiting everyone who 
travels on them. And in return for enduring this expensive and protracted legal fight, at 
the end of the day Plaintiffs will be left with nothing more than what they originally were 
entitled to under the law. All of this would have been avoided if the County had simply 
done its job. To allow the County to foist this burden onto Plaintiffs, and then simply 
walk away without any consequence for illegal conduct that this Court has already 
condemned, is the very definition of inequity. 
The exceptional nature of this case was not lost on the district court, which stated 
that it "would not hesitate" to award attorneys fees if it concluded that it had authority to 
do so. [R. 3588 p. 22.] Its conclusion that it did not have that authority was based on two 
clear and obvious legal errors. First, the district court applied the wrong legal standard 
for the private attorney general doctrine. Even though the court concluded that Plaintiffs 
had vindicated a public interest, it held that Plaintiffs must prove that this public interest 
was greater than any benefit to Plaintiffs themselves. This is not the correct test under 
the private attorney general doctrine, which does not require a comparison of the public 
and private benefits. Rather, the doctrine only requires that the costs of vindicating the 
public interest outweigh the private benefits of doing so, which is clearly the case here. 
The district court's erroneous test would never be satisfied in a private zoning 
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enforcement case, since such plaintiffs are required to show special damages. As a result, 
the court's error led it to deny Plaintiffs' motion under an incorrect legal standard. 
Second, the district court erroneously concluded that it had no inherent equitable 
authority to award attorneys fees on the specific facts of a case unless there were some 
previously enumerated doctrine that applied. This conclusion is also incorrect, as the 
court's inherent equitable powers are not constrained by formulaic doctrines. Because 
the court concluded that this case was extraordinary and that the equities tipped decidedly 
in favor of an award of attorneys fees, it should have recognized that it had the inherent 
authority to make such an award without having to fit this case into a particular 
conceptual box. 
These are both purely legal issues. This Court should clarify the legal test for the 
private attorney general doctrine, clarify the district court's inherent equitable powers to 
award attorneys fees in exceptional cases, and remand this case for consideration of 
Plaintiffs' motion under the proper legal standards. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Applied the Incorrect Legal Test for the Private Attorney 
General Doctrine. 
The County's repeated assertion that this appeal involves a factual determination 
under the private attorney general doctrine is incorrect. Plaintiffs do not challenge any 
factual determinations made by the district court. Rather, they challenge the legal 
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standard it applied, which is clearly incorrect and would lead to the inevitable denial of 
attorneys fees requests in all private enforcement zoning cases. 
Utah law is clear as to the three elements of the private attorney general doctrine. 
In applying the doctrine, the district court is required to determine: (1) whether a "strong 
or societally important public policy" has been vindicated, (2) whether the necessary 
costs incurred by the plaintiff "transcend" the plaintiffs pecuniary interest, and (3) 
whether the case is "extraordinary." See Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 
P.2d 759, 783 (Utah 1994); Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, \ 24, 100 P.3d 1151; Utahns 
for Better Dental Health-Davis v. Davis County, 2005 UT App 347, f 9, 121 P.3d 39. 
The district court agreed that Plaintiffs had vindicated a public interest in 
obtaining an injunction that restored public roads to safe conditions. [R. 3572.] It also 
agreed that this case was extraordinary, concluding that if it had the authority to award 
fees, it "would not hesitate to do that in this case." [R. 3588 p. 22.] But the court erred in 
applying the second prong of the test. Instead of comparing the costs incurred by 
Plaintiffs in vindicating this public interest with Plaintiffs' pecuniary interest in the case -
the comparison required by Stewart - the district court mistakenly compared the public 
benefit to Plaintiffs' private benefit. [R. 3571.] Because any private plaintiff in a zoning 
enforcement case must show that he has been specially damaged over and above the 
general public, see Culbertson v. Bd of County Comm frs of Salt Lake County, 2001 UT 
108, T| 54, 44 P.3d 642, this balance will always tilt in favor of the private benefit. As a 
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result, the court incorrectly concluded that the private attorney general doctrine did not 
apply: 
[W]hat I think that language [in Stewart] requires me to do is look at the 
results and weigh and determine, you know, who ultimately benefited from 
the specific results in this case? Was it these individual plaintiffs or was it 
the society as a whole? 
[R. 3588 p. 25.] This mistake was repeated in the district court's Order: 
With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private 
attorney general doctrine," in order to grant an award of attorney fees and 
costs under that doctrine, the court must first determine whether the 
plaintiffs' legal action, and the specific relief secured as a result of the 
plaintiffs' action, primarily benefited the plaintiffs individually or, rather, 
primarily benefited the public at large." [R. 3571, ^ J 5 (emphasis in 
original).] 
3fC * * 
Thus, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden under the private attorney 
general doctrine of showing that the public at large primarily benefited 
from the plaintiffs' prosecution of this action. [R. 3572.] 
The County's assertion that a private/public benefit comparison is proper under 
Stewart is contrary to the plain language of that opinion and unsupported by any 
authority. It also ignores common sense. A private plaintiff in a zoning enforcement 
case will always benefit more than the general public if she can show special damages, as 
she must, but she will rarely bring such an action if the cost of doing so exceeds his 
personal benefit. That is why Stewart requires a cost-benefit comparison, rather than the 
private-public benefit comparison created by the district court. 
The County's remaining arguments do not merit lengthy attention. The fact that 
courts in other jurisdictions have not adopted the private attorney general doctrine is 
irrelevant, because this Court has. The assertion that the doctrine only applies if there is a 
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"common fund" created is also incorrect because the "common fund" doctrine is a 
different basis for an award of fees, as the Stewart court expressly recognized: 
In the alternative, if no such fund is created, we find that the private 
attorney general exception to the American rule is applicable to this case 
and that USWC should be ordered to pay those fees. . . . In the absence of 
a common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to require 
the shareholders of USWC to pay the cost of plaintiffs' reasonable attorney 
fees. 
Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783-784 (citing Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977)) 
(emphasis added). 
Finally, the County's assertion that there are factual issues that must be reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard is incorrect. Plaintiffs do not challenge the district 
court's factual determination that Plaintiffs benefited the general public, or that this case 
is extraordinary. They challenge the court's erroneous statement of the second prong of 
the private attorney general doctrine under Stewart - din error that inevitably resulted in 
the denial of Plaintiffs' request for fees. This Court should clarify the proper test under 
Stewart is the comparison of the cost to Plaintiffs against the pecuniary benefit to 
Plaintiffs, and remand this case for a determination by the district court under this 
standard. 
II. The District Court Incorrectly Concluded That Its Inherent Equitable Power 
Was Constrained to Enumerated Doctrines. 
The district court clearly thought that the extraordinary facts of this case warranted 
an award of attorneys fees. But it concluded that it did not have inherent equitable 
authority to make such an award unless some previously enumerated doctrine applied. 
That conclusion is erroneous, as the district court's inherent equitable powers are not 
209034_2 DOC 
limited to specifically enumerated doctrines, but may be based on "the specific 
circumstances of [the] case." Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). This rule makes practical sense, since it 
would be impossible to predict every situation in which the facts of a particular case 
warranted an award of attorneys fees. Enumerated doctrines, like the private attorney 
general doctrine, are general categories for the exercise of the district court's equitable 
authority, not an exclusive and mandatory list. This Court should correct the district 
court's legal, error and remand this case, particularly in light of the district court's 
statement that, "[i]f there were a doctrine either found in a statute or in an opinion that 
gave me authority to award attorneys fees if the County willfully violated its own 
ordinances, I would not hesitate to do that in this case..." [R. 3588 p. 22.] 
Plaintiffs do not suggest that district courts should be given free reign to award 
attorneys fees whenever they see fit. But they should have that authority in exceptional 
cases, and this is a truly exceptional case. The County was not merely negligent; its 
illegal conduct was knowing and willful, having been repeatedly notified by Plaintiffs of 
the developer's illegal conduct. The legal battle Plaintiffs were forced to undertake has 
lasted twelve years, and, despite the enormous expense to Plaintiffs, has resulted in no 
pecuniary benefit to them at all. Furthermore, the injunction Plaintiffs achieved 
vindicated not just their own property rights, but also restored public streets to safe 
conditions. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the district court 
concluded that the equities favored holding the County accountable for the expenses that 
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Plaintiffs have incurred as a result of the County's illegal conduct. This Court should 
clarify that the district court indeed has the authority to make such an award in 
exceptional cases, and remand this case for that determination. 
The County's brief contains no cogent response to this argument. First, the 
County argues that Plaintiffs have failed to marshal the evidence regarding the district 
court's findings regarding its equitable power to award attorneys fees. [Appellees' Brief, 
p. 25.] This argument makes no sense because this is not a factual issue. The district 
court made no factual findings about its equitable authority; it made an erroneous 
assumption that no such authority existed. 
Second, the County claims that Jensen is inapplicable because "Plaintiffs' suit is 
not based on their financing of another person whose support should have been provided 
by the defendant." [Id] This is indeed true, because those were the specific facts of 
Jensen. Plaintiffs here were similarly required to finance the enforcement of laws which 
should have been enforced by the County. More importantly, the Jensen court did not 
require its award of attorneys fees to fit into some pre-determined doctrine. Rather, it 
assessed that award on the specific facts of the case. The same result should govern here. 
Finally, even if this Court were to decide that attorneys fees awards must follow a 
specific doctrine, this case is a perfect example of why attorneys fees should be 
awardable in private plaintiff zoning cases where the governmental entity willfully 
refuses to enforce the law, and where plaintiffs have vindicated a public interest. If 
attorneys fees are not available in those cases, then the government cannot be held 
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accountable in any way for its illegal conduct, and can simply walk away after an 
expensive legal fight. If this were the rule, there would be no incentive for the 
government to actually enforce the law against wealthy and powerful developers, and no 
recourse for private plaintiffs that are required to do what the government would not. 
This result would be disastrous as a matter of public policy and is exactly the type of 
situation in which the court's equitable authority should be invoked.1 
The district court should be instructed that it has the inherent equitable authority to 
award attorneys fees in exceptional cases, and this case should be remanded for that 
determination of whether the specific facts of this case merit such an award. 
III. The Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Apply. 
The County argues that, even if the district court did err, Plaintiffs' request for 
attorneys fees is barred by Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. That assertion ignores 
more than a hundred years of well-settled precedent and is clearly incorrect. 
A. Immunity is No Defense to Equitable Claims. 
As this Court has explained, Utah "has long recognized a common law exception 
to governmental immunity for equitable claims. Neither the passage of time nor the 
enactment of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act has eroded this exception." 
American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1992) (citing El 
Rancho Enters., Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1977)). Since this 
For this reason, the County's argument that Plaintiffs' rule would result in an award of 
attorneys fees any time the government is sued is incorrect. The vast majority of those 
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Court's decision more than a hundred years ago in Auerbach v. Salt Lake County, 23 
Utah 103, 63 P. 907 (1901), "[t]he supreme court has clearly held that 'governmental 
immunity may not be used as a defense to equitable claims[.]%" Shoreline Dev., Inc. v. 
Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Bd. ofEduc. of Granite School 
Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Utah 1983)). See also Bowles v. Utah 
Dep 7 ofTransp., 652 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Utah 1982) ("governmental immunity is not a 
defense to equitable claims"). 
This exception similarly relieves a party from the need to file a notice of claim 
under the Governmental Immunity Act, as such procedures only apply when the claim 
falls within the scope of the Act. "Under well-settled Utah law, no notice of claim is 
required as to equitable claims." Whitney v. Bd. ofEduc. of Grand County, 292 F.3d 
1280, 1287 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002). See also El Rancho Enters., 565 P.2d at 780 (claims 
"based on equitable principles . . . are exempt from notice requirements"). The County's 
suggestion that a notice of claim was required in this case is, therefore, without merit. 
Moreover, even if a notice of claim were required, Plaintiffs complied with that 
requirement more than ten years ago. See Section III.D, infra. 
Plaintiffs' equitable request for an award of attorneys fees and costs in this case 
falls squarely within this exception. The private attorney general doctrine is based in 
equity as a means to make a party whole for expense that was unnecessarily or unfairly 
cases will not involve willfully illegal conduct by a governmental entity, nor will they 
involve vindication of a public interest, such as restoration of public roads. 
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incurred. The relief sought by Plaintiffs derives from the court's "inherent equitable 
power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of 
justice and equity[.]" Stewart v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 888 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) 
(emphasis added). Indeed, because an equitable award of attorneys fees often seeks to 
compensate plaintiffs who take the place of a governmental entity that has abdicated its 
enforcement duties, it makes no sense to extend immunity to the government in such 
situations. 
The fact that Plaintiffs seek a monetary award (as many equitable claims do) does 
not mean their claim is subject to governmental immunity. The equitable claims 
exception has been applied consistently and repeatedly to claims seeking recovery of 
money from the government, including in the context of land use decisions. See, e.g., 
American Tierra Corp., 840 P.2d at 759 (allowing claim for recovery of impact fees 
under unlawful ordinance); El Rancho Enters., 565 P.2d at 779 (allowing claim for 
repayment of overcharges on water services); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1154 
(Utah 1983) (allowing claim for repayment of property taxes); Shoreline Dev., 835 P.2d 
at 207 (allowing claim for payment of reasonable value of services rendered by plaintiff 
in construction dispute); Granite School Dist., 659 P.2d at 1036 (allowing claim for 
payment of interest by Salt Lake County because "[governmental immunity may not be 
used as a defense to equitable claims; nor, need a claim for damages first have been 
presented to the County for [plaintiff] to bring this action"). 
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It is the County's burden to prove that the affirmative defense of immunity 
applies. See Nelson v Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996). It cannot carry 
that burden here. Because the basis of Plaintiffs' request for attorneys fees is equitable 
and invokes this Court's inherent equitable power to award attorneys fees, Plaintiffs' 
request "is not barred by governmental immunity and need not conform to statutory 
notice requirements." Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797 P.2d 419, 422 (Utah 1990). 
Under Utah law. this ends the immunity inquiry. The County's arguments based on 
governmental immunity should accordingly be rejected. 
Even if this Court were to assume for the sake of argument that the Governmental 
Immunity Act applied here, the Act would still not bar Plaintiffs' request for fees and 
costs. The County relies on two exceptions to the general waiver of immunity in the Act: 
(1) the discretionary function exception; and (2) the permit issuance exception. Though 
the Court need not reach these issues, neither exception applies here. 
B. The Discretionary Function Exception Does Not Apply. 
This Court "has always read the discretionary function exception to the immunity 
waiver narrowly. To do otherwise would allow the exception to swallow the rule." 
Johnson v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 2006 UT 15, \ 19, 133 P.3d 402. The County "carries 
the burden to prove that it qualifies for the discretionary function exception to the 
immunity waiver." Id. at |^ 21. In this case, the supposed "discretionary function" for 
which the County seeks immunity is the County's willful, deliberate, and illegal refusal 
to enforce its own ordinances and the Conditional Use Permit it issued to Hermes. Such 
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illegal conduct, strongly condemned by this Court in the prior appeals in this case, is 
hardly a "discretionary function." The County cites no authority for the unusual 
proposition that a governmental entity should be shielded from suit if it simply refuses to 
enforce the law. In fact, Utah law is exactly the opposite. 
Application of the discretionary function exception requires a four-part test. The 
purported "discretionary function" must: (1) necessarily involve a basic governmental 
policy, program, or objective; (2) be essential to the accomplishment of that policy; (3) 
must relate to broad policymaking decisions, rather than implementation or operational 
decisions; and (4) must fall within the scope of the governmental agency's legal 
authority. Johnson, 2006 UT 15, Tj 22 (quoting Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 
667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983)). In this case, the County's conduct fails the second, third, 
and fourth prongs of this test. 
First, and most obvious, this Court has already determined that the County acted 
unlawfully in refusing to enforce its zoning and roadway ordinances and the requirements 
of the Conditional Use Permit. See Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs of Salt Lake 
County, 2001 UT 108, ^  56, 44 P.3d 642. As this Court stated: 
By allowing Hermes to proceed, the County stepped into the quagmire we 
condemned in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, where we emphasized that local zoning authorities 'are bound 
by the same terms and standards of applicable zoning ordinances and are 
not at liberty to make land use decisions in derogation thereof." 1999 UT 
25,1130, 979 P.2d 332, 337-338 (Utah 1999). 
Id. (emphasis added). The County's conduct, in fact, is punishable as a criminal Class C 
misdemeanor under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1003. 
209034 2.DOC 
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Because the County's conduct was illegal, the County, a fortiori, did not "possess 
the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority . . . to do or make the challenged 
act, omission, or decision." Id. at % 22. Cf Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1002(2)(c) (1991) 
("The county may not issue a building permit unless the plans . . . conform to all 
regulations then in effect."); Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, % 25, 57 P.3d 1007 
("[I]t would not be within a municipality's discretion to construct electrical systems and 
power lines that do not meet industry safety standards."). Whether the County had the 
authority to issue the Conditional Use Permit, as the County assumes, is not the question. 
Plaintiffs' claims in this case are not based on the issuance of the Conditional Use Permit, 
but rather on the County's failure to enforce the clear terms of that Permit and other 
applicable ordinances. The County did not have the legal authority to refuse to enforce 
the Permit once issued. 
Second, for similar reasons, the County's conduct cannot have been "essential to 
the realization or accomplishment of [the County's development] policy," as embodied in 
its zoning ordinance, roadway ordinance, and Conditional Use Permit. Johnson, 2006 
UT 15, *§ 22. Rather, as the Utah Supreme Court found in this case, the County's refusal 
to enforce those laws was necessarily contrary to and "in derogation" of that policy. 
Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, % 56. When a governmental entity's conduct is disconnected 
from or contrary to the general policy of the entity, as it was here, the discretionary 
function exception does not shield that conduct from suit. See Johnson, 2006 UT 15, ^ | 
26-29 (rejecting application of discretionary function exception because agency's 
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decision to use cones rather than concrete barriers on interstate was contrary to broad 
goal of public safety). 
Third, even if the County's conduct in this case were not outside the scope of its 
legal authority, and even if it were consistent with the County's development policy, the 
County's operational decisions with respect to the Shopping Center, including the 
specific metes and bounds allowed to Hermes that gave rise to Plaintiffs' claims, are not 
the type of broad policy-making decisions covered by the discretionary function 
exception. The exception only covers functions "requiring evaluation of basic 
governmental policy matters and [does] not include acts and decisions at the operational 
level[.]" Id. at T| 31 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996)). 
In this Court's recent Johnson decision, for example, which involved a claim that the 
government was negligent in failing to erect concrete barriers during construction on I-
15, this Court found that the broad policy-making decision "was whether or not to 
perform the construction on 1-15." Id. at ^ 34. This Court directly distinguished this 
broad policy-making decision from conduct involving implementation of that policy, 
which was not covered by the exception: 
Thus, the overarching decision regarding whether or not to undertake the 
construction qualifies as the type of policy-making for which the 
government is entitled to immunity. The manner in which the construction 
occurred, however, is where the line is drawn between operational and 
policy decisions. 
Id. at Tffl 34-35 (emphasis in original). 
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In this case, the broad policy-making decision was whether to allow Hermes to 
build the Shopping Center and whether to issue the Conditional Use Permit. Those are 
not the acts Plaintiffs challenged. Plaintiffs challenged the manner in which the 
Shopping Center was built and the County's failure to enforce its ordinances and the 
requirements of the Permit. The County did not have an> discretion to refuse to enforce 
its own laws, much less discretion that was grounded in general County policy. As in 
Johnson, the County's failures with respect to the manner in which the Shopping Center 
was constructed do not constitute broad-based policy judgments, and thus do not qualify 
for the immunity exemption. Id. 
If there were any doubt as to this point, this Court has twice rejected application of 
the discretionary function exception where the alleged "function" is the failure to fulfill a 
duty assumed by virtue of an agency's policy decisions or laws. See Little, 667 P.2d at 
51-52 (discretionary function exception did not apply where DFS failed to supervise 
foster child it had placed in care, since the exception does not apply when the claim is 
"whether due care was exercised under a duty assumed," and the failure to fulfill that 
duty was "implemental in nature"); Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575-76 (discretionary function 
exception did not apply where city failed to fix a dangerous fence; though it had no 
inherent duty to construct the fence, once constructed, the city's "decision to ignore this 
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dangerous condition" did "not involve a basic governmental policy-making function" and 
thus was not immune). 
In short, the discretionary function exception has no application here. It was never 
intended as an official pardon for an agency's unlawful, and in this case intentional, 
abdication of duty. Indeed, extending immunity to such conduct would be disastrous as a 
matter of public policy and would run directly contrary to this Court's strong 
condemnation of the County's conduct in this case. Because the County did not have any 
authority to refuse to enforce its zoning and roadway ordinances and the requirements of 
the Conditional Use Permit, because its conduct was contrary to the County's policies, 
and because its failure to enforce its own laws does not constitute a general policy-
making decision, the discretionary function exception does not apply. 
C. The Permit Exception Does Not Apply. 
The County also relies upon the exception to immunity waiver for "the issuance, 
denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or 
7 
This point of distinction also illustrates why none of the four cases cited by the County 
are relevant here. None of the County's cases involves the failure to enforce laws or 
ordinances, nor do they involve operational decisions secondary to a broad policy 
decision regarding approval of a project. Instead, the County's cases simply stand for the 
proposition that the broad decision as to whether to approve or deny a permit or project is 
a discretionary function. That may be true, but that is not the conduct at issue here. See 
Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979) (challenging decision not to approve 
subdivision plan); Lovelandv. Or em City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987) (challenging 
decision to approve subdivision plan); Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797 P.2d 419 
(Utah 1990) (challenging decision to release bond on development project, which 
plaintiff claimed was negligent); D.CA. Dev. Corp. v. Ogden City Mun. Corp., 965 F.2d 
827 (10th Cir. 1992) (challenging decision denying occupancy permit). 
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revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization^]" Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1991). The County relies on four cases that each involve claims 
based on the issuance or failure to issue permits. 
As explained above, this exception is irrelevant here. Plaintiffs have not sued the 
County based on its issuance of the Conditional Use Permit to Hermes. Plaintiffs 
challenged the County's failure to enforce that Permit, as well as the zoning and roadway 
ordinances. Not surprisingly, Section 63-30-10 contains no language immunizing a 
governmental entity for failing to enforce the terms of the permits it issues, particularly 
where, as here, the entity's conduct was intentional and knowing, and none of the cases 
cited by the County involve such facts. Indeed, the County's reading runs directly 
contrary to this Court's decisions in Little and Nelson, which stand for the proposition 
that a governmental agency is not immune for failing to fulfill a duty it undertakes. See 
Little, 667 P.2d at 51-52; Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575-76. As a result, the so-called "permit 
exception" does not immunize the County from its unlawful conduct here. 
3
 See Wilcox v. Salt Lake City Corp., 484 P.2d 1200 (Utah 1971) (denial of waitress 
permits); Metro. Fin. Co. v. State, 714 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986) (issuance of automobile title 
certificate); DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995) (issuance of temporary occupancy 
permit); Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 2005 UT App 402, 
2005 Utah App. Lexis 394 (Sept. 22, 2005) (unpublished) (denial of conditional use 
permit). 
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D. Even if a Notice of Claim Were Required, Plaintiffs Met that Requirement 
Ten Years Ago. 
The County's final immunity argument is the assertion that Plaintiffs' attorneys 
fees request is barred because they never filed a notice of claim. As demonstrated above, 
there is no notice of claim requirement for an equitable request for attorneys fees. See El 
Rancho Enters,, 565 P.2d at 780. 
Moreover, the County's assertion is factually incorrect. Plaintiffs did serve a 
notice of claim on the County more than ten years ago, on February 3, 1995, detailing the 
County's illegal conduct under applicable ordinances and the Conditional Use Permit, 
and providing notice that Plaintiffs intended to seek damages caused by the County's 
conduct. [R. 2859-67.] 
Thus, the Governmental Immunity Act is irrelevant to Plaintiffs' request for 
attorneys fees. The Act does not apply to equitable remedies, and even if it did, neither 
of the two exceptions relied upon by the County immunize its unlawful refusal to enforce 
its own ordinances and the terms of the Conditional Use Permit. The County's immunity 
arguments should accordingly be rejected. 
IV. CLUDMA Does Not Bar Plaintiffs' Request for Attorneys Fees. 
The County next asserts that Plaintiffs' request for attorneys fees is barred by 
"CLUDMA", the County Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 17-27-101, et seq. The County admits that Plaintiffs' claims in this case challenged 
the enforcement of the County's land-use decision, and not the land-use decision itself, 
but the County asserts, without any legal support, that those claims also are subject to 
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CLUDMA, [Appellees' Brief, p. 27], and that CLUDMA does not expressly provide for 
recovery of attorneys fees. 
The County's argument does not merit lengthy attention because it has already 
been rejected by this Court. In the first Culbertson appeal, this Court expressly rejected 
the assertion that Plaintiffs' claims were governed by the procedural requirements of 
CLUDMA, which applies "only when a party desires to challenge a land use decision/' 
Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, \ 30. Because "Plaintiffs do not challenge any decisions made 
under [CLUDMA], but instead seek enforcement of decisions made pursuant to it, i.e., 
zoning ordinance and the CUP," Plaintiffs' claims do not constitute "an appeal of a land-
use decision" subject to CLUDMA. Id. The Court's determination on this legal issue is 
the law of the case and need not be revisited. 
Furthermore, the County's argument is predicated on a false premise - that 
attorneys fees are not recoverable unless expressly provided by statute. Nothing in 
CLUDMA states that the statutory remedy of injunctive relief is the only remedy to 
which a plaintiff is entitled, nor does the statute attempt to preempt the inherent equitable 
power of a district court to fashion appropriate remedies As explained above, the private 
attorney general doctrine is an equitable remedy that is available precisely because the 
statute does not otherwise provide for recovery of attorneys fees. The County's 
unsupported assertion that attorneys fees can only be awarded if a statute says so is 
legally incorrect. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court's denial of Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys fees was based on 
two legal errors. First, the court applied the wrong test for the private attorney general 
doctrine; second, the court erroneously concluded that it had no inherent equitable 
authority to award attorneys fees under the exceptional facts of this case. This Court 
should correct both of those legal errors and remand this case for a determination of 
Plaintiffs' request for attorneys fees under the correct legal standards. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ZS day of March 2007. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
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